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RECENT BOOKS 
THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES. By]. H. C. Morris and W. Barton 
Leach. London: Stevens & Sons. 1956. Pp. xlviii, 336. $8.90. 
It is more than seventy years since the publication of a book on the 
Rule Against Perpetuities intended for the use of lawyers of the British 
Commonwealth. That period has seen John Chipman Gray's definitive ex-
position of the Rule, basic statutory changes in the English law of property, 
and a vast accumulation of precedent by the courts of the Commonwealth 
and the United States. The publication of such a book by a competent 
English scholar and a leading American authority is an event of major 
importance. 
The preface states that the book, in its present form, was written by Dr. 
Morris. The first nine chapters (Introduction, Vesting, Elements of the 
Rule, Application of the Rule to Gifts to Classes, Application of the Rule 
to Powers of Appointment, Effect of a Violation of the Rule, Application of 
the Rule to Charitable Gifts, Application of the Rule to Various Types of 
Interest, Construction and the Rule) are based mainly on the American 
Law of Property1 and on articles previously published by the authors.2 
These chapters were "read and commented on" by Professor Leach. The 
remaining three chapters (The Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell and the Cy-
pres Doctrine Before 1926, The Rule Against Accumulations, Trust for 
Non-charitable Purposes) are the work of Dr. Morris alone. Dr. Morris 
has been remarkably successful in blending these diverse materials into a 
unified treatise while preserving Professor Leach's pungent style and adapt-
ing his illustrations (set off typographically from the text and based on 
actual cases or vivid hypothetical situations) to English conveyancing 
practices. The work attempts to be exhaustive in the citation of English, 
Irish and British Commonwealth decisions.3 It is selective in the use of 
United States authority but contains numerous citations to the American 
Law Institute Restatement of the Law and to treatises and law review 
articles published in this country. It must be somewhat novel to British 
readers to find an English treatise suggesting that legislatures of American 
states have improved on Parliament (pp. 34, 86-89) and that the courts of 
Georgia and Missouri have reached sounder conclusions than those of the 
Court of Appeal. (pp. 231, 245) 
1 Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
I.AW OF PROPERTY 1-64 (1952). 
2 Notably, Leach, "Powers of Sale in Trustees and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 
47 HARv. L. REv. 948 (1934); Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 
51 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1938); Morris and Leach, "Options to Purchase and the Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 18 CoNv. (N.S.) 576 (1954); Morris, "Ulterior Limitations and ~ 
Rule Against Perpetuities," IO CAMB. L.J. 392 (1950); Morris, "The Rule Against Per-
petuities and the Rule in Andrews v. Partington," 70 L.Q. REv. 61 (1954). 
3 The Table of Cases lists approximately 957 English cases, 65 Irish, 199 from other 
countries of the Commonwealth and 46 from the United States. 
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The authors' exposition of the law as it is leaves little to be desired. It 
is lucid, almost invariably accurate, well illustrated and as simple as the 
abstruse nature of the subject permits. At one point the authors state that, 
to comply with the Rule Against Perpetuities, an interest must be certain to 
become "vested" within the perpetuity period.4 This is, of course, inac-
curate. If it were correct, no interest could be limited to a person not in 
being. What the Rule requires is that a future interest be incapable of 
vesting at a time beyond the perpetuity period. Although they are careful 
to admit the dearth of authority on the question, the authors are perhaps 
a little too positive in asserting that all facts occurring before the expiration 
of a special power of appointment may be considered in determining the 
validity of a gift in default of appointment. (pp. 152-155) In discussing the 
application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to possibilities of reverter and 
rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent the authors appear to 
assume that, apart from the Rule, English law permits the use of these 
devices to impose use restrictions in -conveyances to private persons. (p. 211, 
illus. 18, 19) The soundness of this assumption is open to question.5 
In the American Law of Property Professor Leach conceded that either 
the Rule Against Perpetuities or an associated rule invalidates provisions 
making private trusts indestructible for longer than the perpetuity period.6 
He prescinded from this aspect of the Rule on the ground that Professor 
Scott was about to treat it fully in a new edition of his treatise on trusts.7 
In the present work Dr. Morris has included an elaborate chapter (c. 12) 
on the permissible duration of honorary trust in which he takes the posi-
tion that it is an associated rule rather than the Rule Against Perpetuities 
itself which limits their duration. (p. 314) In another place he appears to 
state that the Rule itself limits the duration of restraints upon anticipation 
imposed on married women. (p. 224) He omits discussion of this proposi-
tion, however, on the ground that such restraints "have now been abolished 
in England and are rarely encountered elsewhere." Although Claflin v. 
Claflin8 and the dictum in Nichols v. Eaton9 are not followed in the 
British Commonwealth, it seems unfortunate that the authors did not 
choose . to discuss the perpetuity problem connected with restraints on 
termination of trusts for private persons. Such a discussion might well be 
related to one of the possibility of ameliorating the harshness of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities by allowing interests which violate it to be enforced 
in part. 
4 P. 37. The passage is a paraphrase of §24.18, AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, which is 
similarly inaccurate. The Rule is correctly stated in the quotation from Gray on page 50. 
5 CHESHIRE, MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 522-523 (1949); Fratcher, "De-
feasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan," 52 MICH. L. REv. 505 (1954). Massachusetts 
law does permit such use. · 
1, 6 Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY §24.1 (19q2). 
7 Id., §24.67. 
s 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). 
9 91 U.S. 716 (1875). 
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The authors have criticized Professor John Chipman Gray on the 
ground that he stressed history and logic and seldom reexamined the 
basis of rules from the standpoint of modem requirements.1° By "logic" 
they appear to mean the solution of new problems by deductive reasoning 
from principles laid down in old cases. Their book is certainly not sub-
ject to this criticism. The preface states: 
"Its main emphasis is placed, not on history and logic, but on the 
way the Rule functions in its modem environment and fulfils the needs 
of modem society. A feature of the book to which we attach some im-
portance is that it offers critical comment, segregated and designated 
as such, to assist the profession in developing a law of perpetuities 
adapted to modern needs and free from the defects of existing doctrine." 
This is the most valuable feature of the book for scholars in the United 
States. 
The authors do not propose to abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities or 
to change its nature from a rule against remoteness of vesting. They do 
propose a number of modifications designed to mitigate the harshness or 
inconvenience of its present operation. As to the perpetuity period, they 
suggest legislative limitation of the number of permissible measuring lives.11 
They also suggest that the twenty-one year period beyond lives in being be 
increased by at least four years.12 As to the determination of whether an 
interest is certain not to vest beyond the period, the authors suggest that 
such contingencies as "when my will is proved" or "when my estate is 
realized" ought not to be deemed too remote. (pp. 73-74) They propose 
legislative abolition of the conclusiveness of the presumption that every-
one is capable of having children, regardless of age or physical condition, 
and favor the English courts following the tendency of the American in 
construing limitations to the children of a person known to the testator to 
be very old as not including possible afterbom children. (pp. 74-81) They 
propose abolition of the "all or nothing rule" under which a gift to a class 
is wholly void if the interest of any possible member of the class may 
possibly vest beyond the perpetuity period although the interests of some 
members are already vested or certain to vest within the period. (pp. 118-
10 Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAw OF PROPERTY §24-.1 (1952); Morris, Book Review, 72 L.Q. REv. 137 (1956). Compare 
T. C. Williams' commendation of Gray for "bold and original criticism of the authorities." 
Book Review, 22 L.Q. REv. 323 at 324- (1906). In the Preface to the first edition of THE 
RULE AcAINsr PERPETUITIES (1886) Professor Gray criticized R. G. Marsden, the contempo-
rary English authority, for failure to-consider history. 
11 Pp. 66-67. Unlike the New York statutes, this change is not proposed with a view 
to shortening the period but merely to avoid the inconvenience and expense of determin-
ing the fact of the deaths of a hundred or more persons. 
12 Pp. 67-68. As to non-commercial dispositions, the authors cite with apparent ap-
proval the Wisconsin legislative extension of the period to lives in being plus thirty years 
but consider the Prince Edward Island extension to lives in being plus sixty years ex-
cessive. As to commercial transactions they suggest a different period in gross for each 
type and that the disposition be void only as to the excess instead of in toto. The same 
suggestion, that invalidity be only as to the excess, is made as to the rule limiting the 
duration of honorary trusts. P. 311. 
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125) They think that the exemption from the Rule of shifting interests 
from one charity to another should be limited to those in which the event 
upon which the shift is to take place is relevant to the fulfilment of the 
charitable purpose. (pp. 185-188) They suggest legislation wholly exempt-
ing options and administrative powers from the operation of the Rule. 
(pp. 220, 232) On the other hand, the authors think that possibilities of 
reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent should be 
subjected to the Rule with, possibly, legislative permission for such interests 
to be enforceable for thirty years after the fee simple becomes possessory. 
(pp. 206-211) Except, possibly, that relating to the conclusive presumption 
of ability to procreate, the foregoing proposals are constructive, conserva-
tive and unlikely to evoke much opposition except inertia. 
Under the common law Rule Against Perpetuities an interest is void if, 
at the time when the instrument creating it becomes effective, any possible 
combination of events could cause it to vest beyond the perpetuity period.18 
This is true even though the interest actually vests within the period and 
before its validity is litigated. Because the Rule is thus applied on the 
basis of possibilities rather than actualities and so strikes down as "per-
petuities" interests which did not in fact tie up property for an excessive 
period, an English writer proposed fifty years ago that the Rule be modified 
to permit interests which actually vest within the period to stand.14 This 
modification was adopted in Florida by judicial decision and in Pennsylvania 
by statute.15 For the past five years Professor· Leach has waged a vigorous 
campaign for its adoption elsewhere.16 Professor Lewis M. Simes has op-
posed such a modification of the Rule on two grounds: (I) it would post-
pone determination of the validity of interests for an undesirably long 
time after the instrument creating them became effective, rendering the 
property involved practically inalienable in the meantime, and (2) it would 
unsettle the rules for determining the measuring lives in computing the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.17 Professor Leach's original pro-
13 There are exceptions in the case of destructible interests, interests created by the 
exercise of a power of appointment and, possibly, interests limited in default of exercise 
of a power of appointment. 
14 Sweet, "The Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 18 JURID. REv. 
132, 158 (1906). 
15 Story v. First Nat. Bank &: Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 S. 101 (1934); Pennsylvania 
Estates Act, 1947, §4, Pa. Stat. Ann. (1950) tit. 20, §301.4. See also Merchants Nat. Bank 
v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953). 
16 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 721 at 728-730, 747-749 (1952); Leach, "Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the 
Innocents," 68 L.Q. R.Ev. 35, 42-44, 58-59 (1952); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law 
Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§24.11, 24.21 (1952); Leach, 
"Reform of Rule Against Perpetuities: A Proposed Statute,'' 92 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 769 
(1953); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1349 
(1954); Leach, "Perpetuities Reform by Legislation,'' 70 L.Q. R.Ev. 478 (1954); Leach, 
"An Act Modifying and Clarifying the Rule Against Perpetuities," 39 MAss. L.Q. 15 (Oct. 
1954). 
17 Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 
52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 179 (1953); Simes, "Reform of Rule Against Perpetuities: Qualified 
Endorsement," 92 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 770 (1953); Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetui-
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posal on this point was for legislation providing "that the Rule will be 
applied to any interest on the basis of events which have actually occurred 
at the termination of preceding interests, not on the basis of events which 
might have occurred but did not."18 Probably as a result of Professor 
Simes' criticisms, the authors of the book under review have narrowed the 
proposed modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities to one for legisla-
tion providing that in applying the Rule to an interest limited to take effect 
at or after the termination of one or more lives of persons in being when 
the period commences, the validity of the interest shall be determined on 
the basis of facts existing at the termination of such lives.19 Even as so 
narrowed, this proposed modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
seems undesirable. It should not be necessary to wait for eighty years after 
a testator's death before the construction and validity of his will can be 
determined. As Professor Simes has pointed out, in view of the doctrine 
of "infectious invalidity," the validity of present life estates would not be 
determinable until their expiration. 
Under the so-called Old Rule Against Perpetuities, abolished in Eng-
land in 1925 and never applied in this country, a limitation to the issue of 
the unborn taker of a life interest was void. In applying this rule the 
English courts applied a "cy pres" doctrine similar to, but not identical 
with, the doctrine of the same name applied in the law of charities. When, 
because of the Old Rule Against Perpetuities, a limitation to descendants 
of an unborn life tenant was invalid, the unborn life tenant was given 
an estate tail if that would approximate the intent of the grantor or testa-
tor. Although no similar doctrine has been developed by the English courts 
under the modern Rule Against Perpetuities, section 163 of the Law of 
Property Act adopted a cy pres approach to one situation arising under the 
modern Rule by providing that where vesting of an interest is postponed 
until a possibly unborn person reaches an age in excess of twenty-one 
years, the age of twenty-one years shall be substituted for that stated.20 The 
American courts have developed a sort of negative cy pres doctrine, known 
as the doctrine of "infectious invalidity." Under this doctrine, if one in-
terest violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, not only it but other interests 
limited by the same instrument will be deemed to fail if such failure is 
deemed to approximate the probable intent which the grantor or testator 
would have had if he had known that the first interest was void. 
In his earlier publications Professor Leach advocated the development 
of a positive cy pres doctrine in the application of the modern Rule Against 
Perpetuities. He criticized the present rule that an interest which violates 
ties," 103 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 707, 732-733 (1955); SIMES, PUBUC PoUCY AND THE DEAD 
HAND 65-66, 72-73 (1955) .• 
18 65 HARV. L. RE.v. 747 (1952). 
19 Pp. 83-89. This narrower modification of the Rule is embodied in Massachusetts 
legislation of 1954 and Connecticut and Maine legislation of 1955. 
20 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, §163 (Law of Property Act, 1925). The Massachusetts, Connecticut 
and Maine legislation referred to in the preceding note contains similar provisions. 
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the Rule is always wholly void and asserted, "Court should have power to 
apply the Rule Against Perpetuities by striking down only those aspects of 
a gift which exceed permissible limits and then 'framing a scheme' (to use 
the terminology of cy pres) which will most nearly approximate the estate 
plan of the testator or settlor while still remaining within the limits of the 
Rule."21 
Although they state that "the introduction of a general cy pres jurisdic-
tion would probably render all other statutory changes unnecessary," (p. 
34) the authors, in the book under review, suggest that its adoption would 
be impracticable because it is likely to prove "unpopular with the judges 
who would be called upon to exercise it." (p. 35) If this is true, it does not 
follow that the judges would object to statutory provisions like section 163 
of the Law of Property Act, providing cy pres solutions for specific common 
situations arising under the Rule. Dr. Morris even opposes the doctrine of 
"infectious invalidity." (pp. 125, 163-165) This virtual abandonment of the 
proposal for a positive cy pres doctrine under the Rule Against Perpetuities 
contrasts oddly with the authors' views as to the "all or nothing" rule (pp. 
IIS-125) and their strong preference for the view that the effect of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities may be considered in determining the construction of 
limitations. (pp. 236-247) It seems unfortunate that two such able pro-
ponents of reform should have withdrawn their support from what is prob-
ably the most promising proposal for reducing the harshness of the opera-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
This book is a major contribution to the literature of the law. Every 
British Commonwealth lawyer who deals with property or trusts must have 
it. American scholars, whether or not they· agree with the proposals for 
reform, will welcome their lucid presentation. 
William F. Fratcher, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Missouri 
21 65 HAR.v. L. ·R.Ev. 736 (1952). Professor Simes favors this proposal. 52 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 193 (1953); 92 TRUSTS AND EsTATES 770 (1953); 103 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 728, 733-736 
(suggesting a special legislative cy pres solution for each common situation); SIMES, PUBLIC 
POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 69, 74-79· (1955). 
